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Declining Caseloads/
Increased Work: What Can 
We Conclude about the 
Effects of Welfare Reform?
I. Three Simultaneous Events
n 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, or PRWORA, which 
substantially restructured public assistance programs. 
PRWORA gave states almost entire discretion to design and 
operate cash assistance programs for families with children, 
reducing the role of the federal government in program 
operation and regulation. The federal government did 
continue to help states fund these programs through the newly 
created Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
block grant. In addition, the federal government required states 
to move an increasing share of their caseloads into work and 
also, for the first time in history, implemented time limits on 
how long most families could receive TANF-funded assistance. 
As a result of this legislation, states have made major 
changes to the structure of their family assistance programs. 
States have increased the incentives for public assistance 
recipients to move into work by reducing the rate at which 
benefits fall as earnings rise, by implementing more extensive 
job placement welfare-to-work programs, and by reinforcing 
the message of time limits that cash assistance will come to an 
end. States have also increased the penalties and sanctions for 
those who do not comply with work efforts, and have begun 
serious “diversion” programs aimed at diverting applicants 
from public assistance in the first place. Different states have 
chosen different “packages” of these policies, so that one must 
understand the entire mix of policies in order to characterize 
the welfare programs in any state.1 For instance, states with low 
benefit-reduction rates—a more generous policy that allows 
clients to keep a higher share of benefits as they go to work—
may offset this generosity with very strict sanction policies for 
those who do not participate in welfare-to-work programs. 
States with strong diversion programs may reinforce this 
“discouraging” effect on caseloads by also implementing short 
time limits. States with generous welfare benefit levels may run 
more intensive welfare-to-work efforts in an attempt to move 
people into work faster.
These major policy changes in public assistance programs 
did not occur in a vacuum, but coincided with two other 
important changes in the economic environment in the mid-
1990s. First, the U.S. economy entered a period of strong and 
sustained growth. Unemployment rates fell to their lowest 
levels in thirty years, employment grew rapidly, and inflation 
remained relatively restrained. These economic changes 
disproportionately helped less skilled workers, cutting 
unemployment rates among high-school dropouts by more 
than half. By the late 1990s, unemployment rates among black 
and Hispanic workers were at all-time lows. 
As part of this boom, starting in the mid-1990s, wages 
among less skilled workers also began to rise for the first time 
in two decades. Average real weekly earnings among full-time 
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male workers who did not have a high-school degree rose 
5 percent between 1995 and 1999, while they rose 4 percent 
among full-time female workers.2 This combination of rising 
wages and rising job availability greatly strengthened the 
incentive to work.
The last major change that occurred in the 1990s was the 
implementation of a series of policy changes focused on 
increasing the returns to work among less skilled and low-wage 
individuals. The minimum wage rose from $3.35 at the 
beginning of 1990 to $5.15 by 1997. Equally important, a series 
of expansions in the earned income tax credit (EITC) greatly 
increased the subsidies received by low-wage workers through 
the tax system. By 1999, a mother with two children working 
full-time in a minimum-wage job could receive over $3,500 in 
a refundable tax credit, a substantial addition to her income. A 
key design issue in the EITC is that one must work in order to 
receive any EITC benefits and—at least for low-wage labor 
market participants in low-income families—EITC benefits 
rise as work increases. As noted in Blank and Schmidt (2001), 
the combination of the EITC and the minimum-wage changes 
substantially increased after-tax wages among minimum-wage 
workers with children. By the late 1990s, a full-time minimum-
wage worker with two children had an income above the 
poverty line.3
Any of these three events—the enactment of major welfare 
reform, the economic expansion, and the expansion in work 
support programs—should have affected the behavior of less 
skilled workers and encouraged greater labor force 
participation. As it happens, all three of these occurred at about 
the same time, serendipitously producing a very large change in 
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Chart 1
Total AFDC/TANF Caseloads
Millions of AFDC/TANF households
Source: Department of Health and Human Services Administration for 
Children and Families. <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/news/stats/3697.htm> 
Note: AFDC is Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
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Regardless of cause, the behavioral changes over the 1990s 
among welfare recipients have been amazingly large. Public 
assistance caseloads have declined by half since their peak in 
1994. (Even the strongest supporters of the 1996 legislation did 
not dare predict a change this large.) Chart 1 shows the 
magnitude of change in caseloads over the 1990s, with a sharp 
increase in the early 1990s followed by an even greater decline 
in the late 1990s.
Workforce participation has increased at the same time. In 
March 1994, 23 percent of those receiving welfare in 1993 were 
observed at work. By March 1999, 40 percent of welfare 
recipients from 1998 were working.4 Labor market partici-
pation among single mothers with young children—the group 
historically most likely to rely on welfare—soared during this 
time period. Chart 2 plots the labor force participation rates 
among women by marital status and children from 1989 to 
1999. Unmarried women with children under age eighteen 
have experienced more than a ten-point increase in labor force 
participation over the 1990s. 
At the same time, average incomes among less skilled single 
mothers have increased while poverty among single mothers 
has reached an historic low (Haskins 2001). Despite substantial 
declines in public assistance income, earnings have risen to 
offset the loss of welfare benefits, and income among less 
skilled mothers has not fallen. While there is evidence of 
economic stagnation among some of the more economically 
disadvantaged over the past several years, the majority of less 
skilled women appear to have higher incomes by the late 
1990s.5
The record since the mid-1990s is quite incredible: there 
have been large and fast reductions in caseloads, increases 
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magnitude of these changes have driven researchers to try and 
understand their underlying causes, focusing on the factors 
discussed above.
II. Evaluating the Effects 
of Welfare Reform
Those who study welfare reform are particularly interested in 
disentangling the effect of the 1996 legislation from other 
changes. This is an extremely difficult analysis to undertake, for 
at least three reasons. First, as noted above, the timing of 
welfare reform coincides almost perfectly with the last round of 
minimum-wage and EITC expansions. The mid-1990s was also 
a period when the economic expansion became more vigorous 
and wages among less skilled workers started to rise. Whenever 
such major events occur at about the same time, it is difficult to 
identify their effects separately.
Second, the economic and the policy changes were not just 
simultaneous, they were also endogenous and intercausal. For 
instance, a variety of states enacted precursor programs to 
federal welfare reform under a program that granted states 
waivers to experiment with stronger work enforcement among 
public assistance recipients. The states that enacted these 
programs had higher average unemployment rates than the 
states that chose not to enact them.6 This strongly suggests that 
the types of policies adopted following the 1996 legislation are 
also likely to be differentially chosen in states with different 
economic environments. Conversely, states that chose to adopt 
stronger measures that pushed welfare recipients into work 
faster after 1996 might have affected the wage and employment 
opportunities for less skilled workers in their labor markets.7 
All of this suggests that it will be quite difficult to identify 
separately the economic versus policy effects. 
Third, there are likely to be a substantial number of indirect 
effects arising from economic growth that are hard to measure 
separately. Not only will the economic expansion increase job 
availability and earnings among current and past welfare 
recipients, but it will also increase earnings among their friends 
and relatives. Boyfriends and family may be more willing to 
share housing or to share income in good economic times, 
making it easier for women to leave welfare even if they 
themselves are not working more or earning more. In addition, 
the ready availability of jobs almost surely affected the speed 
and the nature of state design and implementation of welfare 
programs after 1996. Precisely because they did not have to 
focus on job availability, states were able to devote more time 
and attention to new program design and to focus on 
implementation of these programs. This suggests that the 
strong economy might have allowed states to move both 
further and faster as they redesigned their welfare programs. 
All of these factors make it difficult to identify separately the 
effects of the 1996 welfare reform. But even if there had been no 
economic boom and no other policy changes, providing an 
evaluation of the 1996 welfare reform legislation would be 
difficult. The federal legislation was implemented at close to the 
same time in all states. Between September 1996 and July 1997, 
all fifty states switched to running new TANF-funded welfare 
plans, with most states inaugurating their new programs within 
a few months of each other. This makes it difficult to rely on 
differences in implementation dates across states to identify 
differential program impacts.
In addition, there are timing problems with current 
evaluations. We only have a few years of post-1996 data  
currently available. While states announced their new plans 
within a year of the 1996 legislation, in many of them 
implementation of these changes was much slower. Many state 
welfare programs were in flux for a year or two after the 1996 
legislation was signed. Evaluating the effects of these programs 
using data from 1996, 1997, and even 1998 might be 
misleading, since many aspects of the programs were only 
partially implemented in these years. 
An additional concern is that some program changes have 
not yet fully taken effect. This is most true of time limits. Only 
a very small number of welfare recipients have currently hit 
their time limits, but over the next several years many more 
persons may face them. This may change the behavior of those 
who are still recipients and will increase the share of involun-
tary leavers among ex-welfare recipients.8 This suggests that 
our current evaluations could seem quite inadequate in only a 
few years.
In short, evaluating the effect of welfare reform is inherently 
difficult by itself, and made even more difficult by the 
simultaneous occurrence of an economic boom and other 
policy changes. These caveats are important to keep in mind 
while reviewing the existing research on welfare reform. All of 
this research is subject to the problems discussed above.
III. The Effects of Economy 
versus Policy
One might validly ask, why try to disentangle these factors at 
all? If one’s interest is in changes in the well-being of ex- or 
current welfare recipients, then simply looking at outcomes 
might be adequate. Indeed, a good deal of the evaluation 
literature on welfare reform takes this approach. The growing 
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economic circumstances of families who were previously 
welfare recipients—makes no attempt to separate out causal 
factors, but simply looks at the work status and income of 
families at some future point after they have left welfare.9 
There are at least two primary reasons for separating 
economic and policy effects. First, those who are operating and 
designing policy may validly want to evaluate the direct effects 
of their efforts. Understanding the comparative effects of 
different state approaches to the design of welfare programs 
might provide knowledge that will be useful in the future as 
states continue to redesign and evaluate these programs. 
Second, there are very different future implications if the 
current changes in behavior are primarily due to policy or to 
economy. If it is structural program changes that have been 
effective in reducing caseloads, increasing work, and raising 
incomes, then these effects may be expected to persist in the 
future. If it is the current economic boom that is the primary 
cause of these changes, then they may be quite changeable and 
temporary. 
For this reason, the question of what is driving caseload 
declines and work increases has deep political implications. 
Those who want to claim success for the 1996 legislation are 
more likely to favor policy-related explanations. Those who are 
critical of the legislation and concerned about its long-term 
impact are more likely to favor economy-related explanations.
The existing research literature that tries to disentangle pol-
icy and economic effects generally suggests that both factors are 
important, although the relative magnitude of effects varies depen-
ding upon the time period and estimation strategy chosen.
Table 1 presents the major empirical studies that attempt to 
separately assess the effects of policy and economy, utilizing 
data up to 1996. These studies are only indirectly relevant to the 
evaluation of the 1996 reforms—they focus on caseload 
changes in the earlier Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) program and do not go beyond the 1996 welfare 
reform in their analysis. The welfare reforms that they focus on 
are the waivers granted to states in the 1992-96 period, which 
allowed states to run welfare-to-work programs that were more 
strongly enforced and that covered a larger share of the welfare 
population. Table 2 summarizes the smaller group of studies 
that utilize data after 1996 and attempt to explicitly evaluate the 
1996 legislation. Most of these studies focus solely on caseload 
changes, but a few investigate a broader range of outcomes.
The approach in most of these studies is to use panel data on 
state outcomes—typically state caseload numbers from 
administrative data—and estimate the impact of economic 
variables—typically state unemployment rates—and policy 
variables while controlling for state- and year-fixed effects. A 
number of studies also control for state-specific time trends, or 
use more complex first difference or lagged dependent variable 
models. The hope is that these extensive controls for fixed and 
trend effects will substitute for the large number of omitted 
variables in these regressions, such as differences in political 
and population characteristics. 
Among these omitted variables, I should note, is the effect of 
the labor market policies mentioned above. The federal 
minimum wage and the EITC changes are not explicitly 
controlled for in most of these regressions, but because these 
policies changed everywhere in the same year, they are assumed 
to be taken up in the year-fixed effects. This may not be fully 
adequate; for instance, changes in the minimum wage should 
have greater effects in low-wage states than in high-wage states. 
To the extent that the minimum-wage changes and the EITC 
changes are coterminous with welfare changes—and the 
welfare changes chosen in any state may partially reflect the 
presence of these policies—the estimated welfare effects may be 
biased upward due to these omitted variables. 
The studies in Table 1 identify the impact of welfare reform 
based on differential timing in the implementation of welfare 
waivers across states. Most of these studies use data similar to 
those of the Council of Economic Advisers (1997), or CEA, and 
reach similar conclusions. They find that economic factors 
explain somewhere between 25 to 50 percent of the observed 
change in caseloads. Welfare reform waivers typically explain a 
smaller share of the caseload change. Blank (2001) and Wallace 
and Blank (1999) are the only papers that differentiate between 
the periods of rising versus falling caseloads (that is, the period 
up to 1994 and the period from 1994 to 1996); other papers 
look at changes over a time period that spans both increases 
and declines in caseloads, typically 1993 to 1996.10 These first 
two papers find that waivers actually explain a negative share of 
caseload change between 1990 and 1994—that is, the number 
of caseloads was rising but the waivers should have caused it to 
fall. These papers suggest that waivers explain 13 to 31 percent 
of the decline in the 1994-96 period, when caseloads were 
falling.
 Ziliak et al. (2000) and Figlio and Ziliak (1999) find 
stronger economic effects and weaker waiver effects than the 
other papers listed in Table 1. In part, this must be due to their 
focus on the 1993-96 time period. The Wallace and Blank 
results suggest that the impact of waivers over this longer 
period must be less than their effects over the 1994-96 period, 
when caseloads declined. Figlio and Ziliak present a series of 
estimates suggesting that their results are closely connected to 
their use of first difference and lagged dependent variable 
models, with extended lags in many of the independent 
variables. In many of these models, the implementation of 
waivers has only a one-time effect—in the period when the 
waiver is adopted—and it is perhaps not surprising that the 
resulting coefficients are not large.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2001 29
Table 1
Major Research on Caseload Change Using Data prior to 1996 Welfare Reform
Study Data Dependent Variable Included Variables Results on Key Variables
Council of 
  Economic
  Advisers 
  (1997)
Annual panel 
  of state 
  administrative 
  data, 1976-96
  
Log (AFDC 
  caseloads) ÷







Share of caseload change due to economic factors: 
    24% to 31% in 1989-93
    31% to 45% in 1993-96
Share of caseload change due to waivers:
    13% to 31% in 1993-96
3% to 5% estimated change in AFDC caseloads




Same as CEA 
  
 Same as CEA 
   
Same as CEA, with more
  detailed data on waivers
Economic effects of same size as CEA 
Waiver states have almost twice the caseload 
     reduction, but no difference in unemployment rate
Ziliak, Figlio,
  Davis, and 
  Connelly 
  (2000)
Monthly panel 
  of state 
  administrative
  data, 1987-96
Log (AFDC 
  caseloads) ÷
  female 
  population 






Time trends (t, t 2, t 3) 
Estimate first difference and 
  lagged dependent variable models
No separate estimates of economic effects alone; 
    66% of change due to economic and seasonal 
    factors in 1993-96  
Share of caseload change due to waivers: 
    -9% in 1993-96  
2% estimated change in AFDC caseloads due to 
     one-point increase in unemployment rate that 




  of state
  administrative
  data, 1977-96
Same as CEA 
  (Also separates 
  this into AFDC-
  child only, 
  AFDC-UP, and 
  core remaining
  caseloads)
Economic (including 
  unemployment and wages) 
Program (including waivers





Share of caseload change due to economic factors:
    29% in 1990-94 
    59% in 1994-96 
Share of caseload change due to waivers:a 
    -22% in 1990-94 
    28% in 1994-96  
5% estimated change in AFDC caseloads due to 
    one-point increase in unemployment rate
Figlio and 
  Ziliak 
  (1999)
Annual panel 
  of state
  administrative
  data, 1976-96






Dynamic models include first
   difference and lagged 
   dependent variable models
In static models:  
Share of caseload change due to economic effects: 
    -10% to 36% in 1993-96  
Share of caseload change due to waivers: 
    0% to 24% in 1993-96
In dynamic models:  
Share of caseload change due to economic effects:
    18% to 76% in 1993-96  
Share of caseload change due to waivers: 
    -7% to 1% in 1993-96
6% to 9% long-run rise in caseloads due to one-point 






  of state
  administrative
  data, 1980-96
Same as CEA Same as Blank Share of caseload change due to economic effects: 
    50% for 1990-94 
    47% for 1994-96  
Share of caseload change due to waivers: 
    -13% for 1990-94 
    22% for 1994-96  
5% to 6% rise in caseloads due to one-point rise in









and age cells by
state)
ln (AFDC 
  participation) ÷
  total female 
  population 







Reduction in participation due to waivers: 
    -1.7 percentage points among women high-school 
    dropouts, -0.8 to -1.0 percentage points among all 
    women 
Among high-school dropouts, significant effects on 
    weeks and hours of work; no significant
    effects on earnings or income
	
		
	participation due to 
    one-point rise in unemployment rate
aAuthor’s calculations, not shown in paper.30 Declining Caseloads/Increased Work
I should note that more of the variation in these studies 
comes from explaining caseload increases rather than caseload 
declines, since caseloads rose sharply between 1990 and 1994. 
One of the striking aspects of these studies is that their 
combined estimates explain a very low share of the overall 
variation in caseloads during this time period once year, state, 
and seasonal effects are excluded. Blank (2001) investigates this 
at some length and focuses on the mix of programs that are 
included in the AFDC caseload numbers. She indicates that 
57 percent of this caseload increase is due to increases in two-
parent welfare-recipient cases (the AFDC-UP program) and in 
child-only cases (welfare cases in which there is no adult 
recipient—a category that rose rapidly in the 1990s). These two 
programs are responsive to quite different factors and are in 
turn very different from the “core” AFDC program, that is, 
benefits paid to single mothers and their children.11 Much of 
the large unexplained rise in caseloads in the 1990s is due to the 
growth in these two programs. As one might expect, waivers 
have stronger negative effects on core AFDC caseloads than 
they do on aggregate caseloads, which are the data used by most 
Table 2
Major Research on Caseload Change Including Data after 1996 Welfare Reform






  of state 
  administrative
  data, 1976-98
Log (AFDC 
  caseloads) ÷
  total population
Unemployment rate 





Share of caseload change due to economic factors:
    26% to 36% in 1993-96
    8% to 10% in 1996-98  
Share of caseload change due to waivers: 
    12% to 15% in 1993-96   
Share of caseload change due to TANF: 





  of state 
  administrative
  data, 1980:1-1998:6
Same as CEA  Unemployment rate 
Waivers and TANF 
State-specific month effects 
Models estimated in first 
  differences and with lagged 
  dependent variables
Estimated caseload change due to economic factors:
    20% to 36% in 1990-94 
    8% to 12% in 1994-98  
Estimated caseload change due to waivers: 
    -4% to -5% in 1990-94 
    26% to 31% in 1994-96  
Estimated caseload change due to TANF: 




  of March CPS 









TANF and waivers have identical (negative) effects on 
    participation, creating a 2.1 percentage point decline 
    (exclusive of time limit effects)  
Time limits have significant negative effect on 
    participation in families with younger children
Schoeni and








age cells by state)
Multiple variables Unemployment rate 






Waivers have a significant effect on AFDC 
    participation, labor market participation, earnings,
    income, and poverty rates, as well as marital status  
TANF has significant negative effects on welfare 
    participation, larger than the effects of waivers  
TANF has relatively small but significant effects on
    earnings, poverty rates, and household structure
Economic factors fully explain labor market changes






  March CPS,
  1983-2000
AFDC/TANF 
  participation and
  employment last
  week
Unemployment rate 






Economic factors have significant effects on both 
    welfare participation and employment in 1992-96 and
    1996-99  
Waivers have significant effects on employment, but
    not on welfare participation 
TANF has a significant effect on welfare participation
    and on employment  
Stronger effects on more educated single mothersFRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2001 31
other studies in Table 1. Indeed, the combination of economic, 
policy, demographic, and political variables in Blank’s study 
(2001) comes close to explaining fully the caseload changes in 
the core AFDC program. 
Table 2 summarizes the studies that include data from the 
post-1996 period and that try to estimate the effects of both 
waivers and the 1996 TANF block grant. Of these, the Council 
of Economic Advisers study (1999) is most comparable to the 
earlier work. This study essentially updates the 1997 CEA 
publication, including data from 1996-98. The results indicate 
that in this post-PRWORA period, the labor market has a 
smaller effect on caseloads (explaining 8 to 10 percent of the 
caseload decline), while welfare reform has a larger effect 
(explaining about 35 percent of the caseload decline). Wallace 
and Blank (1999), using monthly data and more dynamic 
specifications, estimate quite similar effects due to TANF over 
the 1997-98 period.
Schoeni and Blank (2000) analyze the impact of the 1996 
welfare reforms on a much wider range of variables beyond 
caseloads, including workforce participation, weeks and hours 
of work, earnings, income, and poverty rates. They calculate 
these data by age and education cells within each state and year, 
aggregating data from the Current Population Survey. They 
show that the welfare reform effects that they estimate—both 
for waivers and for the implementation of TANF—are 
strongest among the least skilled; they argue that this supports 
their claim that they are measuring the actual effects of policy 
changes. Schoeni and Blank include an extensive discussion of 
the problems of estimating the impact of the 1996 legislation in 
the existing data, and they try several different estimation 
procedures. 
Their results suggest that welfare reform in the post-1996 
period had a larger negative effect on caseloads than did the 
earlier state waivers. In contrast, their labor force participation 
variables are positively affected by waivers, but appear to be 
largely unaffected by the 1996 reforms. Increases in work 
appear to be explained entirely by the strong economy after 
1996. This is consistent with the idea that the 1996 legislation 
focused much more on getting people off of welfare—through 
sanctions, time limits, and diversion activities—while the 
waivers focused more on running strong welfare-to-work 
programs.
Hill and O’Neill (forthcoming) investigate the determinants 
of welfare participation and employment using data on single 
mothers only from the Current Population Surveys. Unlike 
other research, their study does not aggregate observations by 
state, but uses the individual microdata, which make it difficult 
to compare its results with other research. Since the key 
variables of interest—unemployment rates and policy 
changes—are state-level variables, using individual-level data is 
likely to produce much smaller standard errors than in the state 
panel data analysis of other papers. They also do not include 
year-fixed effects (they only include time trends), which makes 
it more likely that changes in minimum wages and in the EITC 
might be contaminating their other state-level variables. 
Nonetheless, their results on welfare participation are similar 
to those of the other papers, indicating that TANF had a larger 
effect in reducing caseloads than did waivers. Hill and O’Neill 
also find strong effects of TANF on employment increases after 
1996—a very different result than Schoeni and Blank produce.
Schoeni and Blank go beyond caseloads and labor force 
participation to also look at earnings and income effects. They 
find sizable, positive, but poorly determined effects of the 1996 
changes on family income among less skilled women, and 
significant negative effects of the legislation on poverty rates. 
Similar to tabulations of income data by Primus et al. (1999), 
Schoeni and Blank find some evidence that among all female 
high-school dropouts, those in the bottom part of the income 
distribution of this very disadvantaged group are not experi-
encing the same increases as those in the middle and top of the 
distribution.
While Schoeni and Blank probably provide the most 
extensive evaluation of the 1996 welfare reform legislation to 
date, they are clear about the limitations of their study. It 
remains hard to identify an independent effect of the 1996 
welfare reform act, given its rapid national implementation. 
The ongoing changes in these programs throughout the 1996-
98 period also mean that any estimated effects may not reflect 
the impact of the more mature programs that were emerging by 
1999. The authors choose not to decompose overall caseload or 
work behavior changes into the share due to policy effects 
versus economic effects, as the earlier literature did frequently, 
out of a concern that these two effects are quite simultaneously 
determined and the coefficients on the economic variables 
reflect far more than the direct effect of these variables on jobs 
or income. 
Summarizing the results in Tables 1 and 2, I would identify 
four major conclusions from these studies to date: 
1. Most of the evidence suggests that both economy and 
policy have mattered; the exact nature of those effects 
varies across studies and time periods. More dynamic 
models appear to produce weaker policy effects, a fact that 
is likely to be related to the specifications used in those 
models.
2. The caseload increases in the early 1990s were due to a 
wide variety of factors, including growth in child-only 
payments and the mandatory implementation of AFDC 
among two-parent families in all states. As a result, 
explaining much of the aggregate caseload rise with 
simple econometric specifications is a difficult task. 
Waiver effects appear stronger when focusing only on 
caseloads among single mothers with children. 32 Declining Caseloads/Increased Work
3. The economy seems to have mattered less in the post-
1996 period and welfare policy has mattered more in 
reducing caseloads than it did in the earlier period. This is 
entirely consistent with the fact that the state TANF-
funded programs were typically more focused on 
sanctions, diversion, and time limits than were the waiver 
programs of the early 1990s. Both the economy and 
waivers appear to have raised employment in the early 
1990s; studies that look at the effect of TANF on 
employment in the late 1990s show more mixed results.
4. While there is a serious need for more evidence on 
outcomes other than caseload declines, the existing 
evidence suggests that both waivers and the 1996 
legislation might have had positive effects on income and 
negative effects on poverty. On average, less skilled 
female-headed families appear to be better off, and the 
1996 legislation seems to be an important causal factor in 
this, even after controlling for economic effects. Among a 
group of the most disadvantaged, less skilled female 
family heads, there is some evidence that incomes have 
not risen and some evidence that poverty has become 
worse. At least one study suggests that the 1996 legislation 
has not had the same effects on this bottom group as on 
less skilled women as a whole (Schoeni and Blank 2000).
IV.  Future Research Issues
For those who want to understand further the relationship 
between economy, policy, and observed behavioral changes in 
the 1990s, several future research projects recommend 
themselves. First, there may be ways to evaluate the impact of 
the 1996 policy changes by looking in a more disaggregate way 
at the policies that different states have implemented. A 
number of organizations are now regularly collecting and 
publishing information on state-specific program parameters, 
and the research community needs to experiment with various 
ways of describing these very different programs in a 
quantitative and comparable form. Some of the studies listed in 
Tables 1 and 2 have tried to estimate separately the effect of 
different types of program changes, such as time limits or work 
exemptions, as well as look at the overall effects of imple-
menting welfare reform. Because data on any particular type of 
program are limited—implemented in only some states and 
over only limited time periods—many of these estimates are 
poorly determined. But as we acquire a growing amount of 
information on changes within states over time, it should be 
possible to do more to tease out the impact of specific types of 
policy changes.
Second, the most obvious way to study the differential 
effects of policy and economy is to wait for the next economic 
slowdown and see what changes. I am doubtful we will be able 
to say anything very conclusive about how much the economy 
has influenced the changes in the late 1990s until we collect 
some observations in a world with less robust economic growth 
and higher unemployment.
Third, it is important to note the need for more studies that 
focus on overall measures of well-being. Too much of the 
existing work looks just at caseloads, a very limited measure 
that provides little information about how the less skilled 
population is faring. Declining caseloads are generally viewed 
as a good thing, but say nothing about work or income among 
those leaving public assistance. Increases in workforce 
participation are generally viewed as a good thing, but these 
data need to be balanced with information on overall 
disposable income as families face greater work-related and 
child-care expenses and lose welfare benefits. 
It will also be important to explore how unique our current 
set of results is to the current time period. This is not only a 
question of separating out the impact of the current economic 
boom, but also relates to some of the implementation 
questions raised above. As a growing share of the caseload hits 
time limits, some state programs may begin to operate 
differently. More and more states are proclaiming that they 
have “changed the culture” of their welfare offices, through 
retraining front-line workers. Most states are still working to 
better integrate their job placement and training efforts with 
their welfare efforts. As all of these changes occur, the long-run 
nature of TANF-funded welfare programs may be different 
from their operations in the immediate post-1996 period.
Whether the long-term effects of welfare reform will be 
greater or smaller than the short-term effects is hard to predict. 
Some arguments suggest that the long-term effects may be 
larger: once recipients begin to hit time limits, there may be 
bigger effects; if recent state changes induce cross-state 
migration over time, there may be bigger effects; if states are 
successful in changing the culture of their welfare offices to 
make them more employment-oriented, that may result in 
bigger long-term effects. But the economic arguments suggest 
that the long-term effects of welfare reform will be smaller: a 
more typical economy will force states to expend more 
resources on finding jobs or creating public sector 
employment, which will take resources out of new programs; 
women will be less willing to be diverted or to avoid welfare in 
a higher unemployment economy, and states will again see 
increases in caseloads. In a slower growth economy, states will 
feel more economic budget pressure and will be less willing to 
focus as much time and money on welfare programs.
At present, I think it is fundamentally unknowable what the 
long-term effects of the 1996 law are likely to be. We have seen 
enormous behavioral changes, including faster exit from and 
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reductions in take-up rates even among the eligible population. 
We have also seen enormous program changes as states have 
greatly modified their old AFDC programs. In the presence of 
this much program and behavioral change, it is simply hard to 
know what is permanent and what may change in the next 
round of program reform or during the next economic 
slowdown.
V. Some Big Remaining Questions
I close this paper with a few of the many unanswered questions 
about future program and behavioral issues that I think will be 
important in the years ahead. First, assuming that the rapid 
decline in caseloads is somewhat permanent, this means that 
the remaining caseloads are more disadvantaged than the 
AFDC caseloads of ten years ago. For instance, Allen and Kirby 
(2000) find that a growing share of the caseload is composed of 
women of color living in center cities, who are more likely to 
face a host of barriers to finding permanent employment. How 
will this change the politics of welfare? Will this make voters 
and politicians even less sympathetic to welfare recipients and 
lead to harsher measures designed to move these women off of 
public support? Or will this generate greater sympathy for 
welfare recipients, as voters realize that those who remain on 
welfare do face multiple barriers to work?
Second, the changes in welfare program design have almost 
surely made less skilled women—and particularly single 
mothers—more vulnerable to the economy. As these women 
rely on earnings for an increasing share of their income, and as 
they face tighter restrictions on their access to public assistance, 
they will be more subject to the vagaries of the labor market. It 
may be that single mothers will become as responsive to the 
labor market as two-parent families have been in the past. For 
instance, Blank (2001) suggests that a one-point rise in 
unemployment raised AFDC caseloads by 6 percent among 
single mothers, but raised AFDC-UP (the program for married 
couples) caseloads by 9 to 17 percent. Women may cycle more 
frequently on and off of welfare, responding to changes in job 
availability in the private sector. A key question is whether 
these women will be able to access the unemployment 
insurance (UI) system during times of joblessness. Policy 
changes to UI could make it easier for part-time and short-
term workers to access benefits; this may be an alternative way 
to support work-eligible single mothers when they become 
jobless.
Third, the current economy has allowed a large number of 
less skilled women (and men) to work more continuously than 
in previous decades. How will this help these women? Will their 
growth in labor market experience lead to significant wage 
growth?12 Will they be able to make contacts and create labor 
market networks for themselves that make it easier to find jobs 
in the future if they leave or lose employment? In short, will this 
extended labor market boom help provide a larger pool of 
workers who are willing and able to work? This is the positive 
version of the “hysteresis hypothesis” much discussed in 
Europe over the past decade, in which extended periods of high 
unemployment appear to result in more workers permanently 
disconnected from the labor market. The 1990s economic 
boom, providing a long-run decline in unemployment rates 
and time spent out of the labor market, may more permanently 
connect a group of disadvantaged workers to the labor market.
Finally, there are a host of questions about the impact of 
these program and economic changes on family fertility and 
formation patterns. Some existing evidence suggests that recent 
welfare reforms can have an effect on marriage.13 Of course, a 
stronger economy might also have this effect, as less skilled 
men appear to be better marriage prospects. We need to move 
beyond a focus solely on income, labor market, and caseload 
changes among single mothers to observe how these program 
and economic changes are related to family formation, to 
fertility, and to the educational plans of younger, less skilled 
men and women. A closely connected question is how these 
changes impact the children in families in which the sole parent 
is now working and earning more and receiving less public 
assistance. Preliminary evidence suggests that there may be 
child-related impacts that vary by age (Duncan and Chase-
Lansdale 2001). In their evaluations of these programs, 
economists need to think broadly about program impacts and 
move beyond their usual set of income and earnings data.
The answers to all of these questions will become clearer as 
time passes and we accumulate additional observations on 
programs, economic forces, and individual behavior. As such, 
the results from current evaluations of the impact of the 1996 
welfare reforms must be considered highly preliminary.Endnotes
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1. For a discussion of the changes occurring inside states, see Nathan 
and Gais (1999). For information on the nature of the new programs 
adopted by states, see the data and related descriptive papers provided 
by the Urban Institute’s Assessing the New Federalism Project.
2. Data were tabulated by the author from the outgoing rotation 
groups of the Current Population Survey. While significant, these 
increases were not enough to overcome the previous fifteen years of 
wage declines. Full-time male high-school dropouts experienced an 
18 percent decline in real wages over the entire 1979-99 period, despite 
rising wages in the late 1990s. Among full-time female workers 
without high-school degrees, real wages fell by a smaller amount 
(5 percent) over the entire 1979-99 period.
3. As part of the 1990s expansion in work support, one might also note 
the large increase in subsidies for child care over the 1990s. There was 
also a substantial expansion of Medicaid insurance in the late 1980s to 
cover all low-income children.
4. Data were tabulated by the author from the March Current 
Population Survey.
5. For a review of the evidence on changes in income since welfare 
reform, see Haskins (2001). For a review of the evidence on changes in 
work and labor market behavior, see Blank and Schmidt (2001).
6. See evidence in Schoeni and Blank (2000).
7. For a review of the evidence on this issue, see Bartik (2000).
8. For a discussion of the current evidence on the effects of time limits, 
see Bloom and Pavetti (2001).
9. A good review of studies of welfare leavers is provided by Brauner 
and Loprest (1999).
10. These papers appear to look at 1993-96 because the CEA report 
focuses on these years. However, the reason why the CEA report 
focuses on these years is purely political—the analysis starts in 1993 
because this is the first year of the Clinton Administration.
11. All states were mandated to run an AFDC-UP program starting in 
1990, and much of the increase in this program was due to new states 
beginning to serve the two-parent population. The rise in child-only 
cases is related to the growing use of sanctions (removing the adult 
from the payment unit), the rising number of immigrants (whose 
American-born children are eligible for assistance, but whose 
immigrant parents are not), changes in the structure and functioning 
of foster care programs, and a rising share of children living in 
households without a parent present.
12. Gladden and Taber (2000) indicate that wages grow with 
experience even among very unskilled women.
13. See Knox et al. (2000) or Schoeni and Blank (2000).References
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